Ike's Bluff, by Evan Thomas, 2012. |
President Dwight Eisenhower. |
Evan Thomas’s 2012 book Ike’s
Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World, completely refutes
the stereotype of Dwight Eisenhower as a caretaker president who only cared
about his golf handicap. Thomas focuses his book exclusively on Eisenhower’s
foreign policy, and he paints a portrait of an engaged leader who was extremely
skilled at using psychology to get what he wanted.
The central thesis of Thomas’s book is that Eisenhower was
determined to keep the United States out of war during his Presidency. As Thomas
writes in the introduction to his book, “Having done as much as any man to win
World War II, Ike devoted the rest of his public service to keeping America and
the world out of World War III.” (p.16) Eisenhower was successful in his goal,
as he avoided confrontations with both the Russians and the Chinese during his
two terms. Eisenhower disliked war, and he wrote in his diary on Memorial Day
1951: “Another Decoration Day finds us still adding to the number of graves
that will be decorated in future years. Men are stupid.” (p.11)
Despite his reputation as a genial grandfatherly figure,
Eisenhower was someone who played his cards very close to the vest. His son
John Eisenhower told Thomas, “I don’t envy you trying to figure Dad out. I
can’t figure him out.” (p.38) Thomas takes on the tricky task of parsing
Eisenhower’s often garbled syntax to figure out what was really on his mind, or
what his true intentions were. Eisenhower was an excellent card player, adapt
at both poker and bridge. He was good enough at poker that he eventually
stopped playing, because he was beating his fellow officers too often. He
shared this skill at poker with his Vice President, Richard Nixon, who won a
significant amount of money playing poker while in the Navy during World War
II. However, I don’t think that Eisenhower and Nixon ever played cards together,
since they had a relationship that was awkward at best. One of my favorite
quotes from Ike’s Bluff is from the
diary of Ann Whitman, Eisenhower’s White House secretary, as she wrote about
Richard Nixon, “the Vice President sometimes seems like a man who is acting
like a nice man rather than being one.” (p.389)
Eisenhower was an excellent bridge player. As Thomas writes,
“He was always thinking several moves ahead, trying to read his opponent and
figuring out how to lead him on or trump him.” (p.41) This skill would serve
him well during the gamesmanship of the Cold War. Complimenting his skills as a
card player, Eisenhower didn’t like to use the telephone to conduct business. According
to Thomas, “He wanted to see people face-to-face, the better to read them.”
(p.42) Golf and cards, Eisenhower’s two main forms of recreation, also taught
him patience, which was something that served him well throughout his
Presidency. In a crisis, Eisenhower time and again was unwilling to make a rash
snap decision that could have provoked war.
Thomas does an excellent job throughout the book of
articulating Eisenhower’s strengths and weaknesses as a leader. Ike was someone
who trusted his subordinates; he was not a micromanager, which was both a
strength and a weakness. Eisenhower was someone who was willing to share credit
and take the blame alone. Because he didn’t need to always take credit to feed
his ego, many people underestimated Eisenhower’s intelligence. Thomas is not
uncritical of Ike, as he thinks that Eisenhower could have done more to calm
the Cold War fears of the American public.
Eisenhower’s ability to get inside the head of his opponents
allowed him to analyze the leaders of the Soviet Union, and he used face-to-face
summit meetings to help him figure out the contradictory Nikita Khrushchev. But
Eisenhower’s trust of his subordinates made him look like a fool during the U-2
incident in 1960, when a U-2 CIA spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union.
This incident soured the Paris summit held shortly afterwards, as Khrushchev
demanded an apology from Eisenhower and stormed out of the summit when Ike didn’t
offer one. Eisenhower had always been cautious about the U-2 spy plane, even as
it delivered photographic confirmation that the United States was well ahead of
the Soviet Union in the race to build nuclear weapons. Richard Bissell was the
CIA man in charge of the U-2 flights, and he assured Eisenhower that it would
be impossible for the Russians to detect the high altitude plane. Bissell was
incorrect. The Russians detected the very first flight of the U-2 in 1956. Russians
planes couldn’t fly as high as the U-2, so they couldn’t shoot it down, but it
was only a matter of time before they could. Unfortunately, Bissell didn’t tell
Eisenhower that the plane was detected, and he instead carried on with the lie
that the plane was impervious to Soviet radar. After the U-2 was shot down in
1960, the White House, thinking that the pilot of the plane was dead, put out
cover stories that it was a high-altitude “weather plane” that had strayed off
course. When Khrushchev revealed that the pilot was in fact alive, the White
House had to change their story. Of course, Eisenhower had been assured by the
CIA that there was no way a U-2 pilot could survive a crash of the plane. The
U-2 incident destroyed the trust that had slowly built up between Eisenhower
and Khrushchev, and it put to rest Eisenhower’s hopes of negotiating an arms
limitation settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the
U-2 incident, Eisenhower should have demanded Bissell’s resignation, and
probably that of complacent CIA director Allen Dulles as well, but true to his
hands off management style, he didn’t. (Bissell and Dulles would later be
forced to resign by JFK after another CIA foul-up with the Bay of Pigs invasion
of Cuba in 1961.)
President Eisenhower’s main nuclear strategy was “massive
retaliation,” which meant that the United States might use nuclear weapons
during any confrontation, and that we would not hesitate to, well, massively
retaliate against our enemies. The policy’s main proponent was Eisenhower’s
Secretary of State, the solemn and humorless John Foster Dulles. While massive
retaliation might sound insane to us today, Thomas illustrates how the strategy
worked for Eisenhower during his Presidency. Because no one besides Eisenhower
really knew when, or if, he would use nuclear weapons in a confrontation, our
opponents backed down from escalating international crises. Thomas makes the
point that Eisenhower’s personal history, and his lifelong service in the military,
gave him the standing necessary to back up the policy. No one really wanted to
mess with the man who had masterminded the D-Day invasion and won World War II
on the Western front in Europe. Had a president with a different background
attempted the policy of massive retaliation, it might have backfired
disastrously.
Throughout Ike’s
Bluff, Thomas is incisive about Eisenhower’s complex personality, using
excerpts from the medical diary of Howard Snyder, Eisenhower’s doctor, to shed
light on Ike’s mood swings. Despite his seemingly endless patience at the
bridge table, Ike had a terrible temper which he struggled to keep under
control, and he once hurled a golf club at Dr. Snyder. Thomas also illuminates Ike’s
health issues, as he suffered a heart attack in 1955 and a stroke in 1957.
After his heart attack, Eisenhower was out of the public eye for about six
weeks as he recovered. It’s difficult to imagine that a president now would be
able to stay out of the public eye for so long in our over-saturated media
culture and still win a resounding re-election victory the following year.
Ike’s Bluff is an
excellent book that I would recommend to anyone who wants to get a better idea
of what kind of President Dwight Eisenhower was. Evan Thomas is a skilled
writer who creates a compelling narrative about a fascinating man and the
global challenges he faced as president.